- Designing Electricity Auctions in the Presence of Transmission Constraints
- Blazquez de Paz, Mario <1979>
Subject
- SECS-P/01 Economia politica
Description
- This paper analyzes the effect that different designs in the access to fnancial transmission rights has on spot electricity auctions. In particular, I characterize the equilibrium in the spot electricity market when financial transmission rights are assigned to the grid operator and when financial transmission rights are assigned to the firm that submits the lowest bid in the spot electricity auction. When financial transmission rights are assigned to the grid operator, my model, in contrast with the models available in the literature, works out the equilibrium for any transmission capacity. Moreover, I have found that an increase in transmission capacity not only increases competition between markets but also within a single market. When financial transmission rights are assigned to the firm that submits the lowest bid in the spot electricity auction, firms compete not only for electricity demand, but also for transmission rights and the arbitrage profits derived from its hold. I have found that introduce competition for transmission rights reduces competition in spot electricity auctions.
Date
- 2014-06-04
Type
- Doctoral Thesis
- PeerReviewed
Format
- application/pdf
Identifier
urn:nbn:it:unibo-12632
Blazquez de Paz, Mario (2014) Designing Electricity Auctions in the Presence of Transmission Constraints, [Dissertation thesis], Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna. Dottorato di ricerca in Economia